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Abstract Most philosophers consider olfactory experiences to be very poor in
comparison to other sense modalities. And because olfactory experiences seem to
lack the spatial content necessary to object perception, philosophers tend to main-
tain that smell is purely sensational or abstract. I argue in this paper that the
apparent poverty and spatial indeterminateness of odor experiences does not reflect
the ‘‘subjective’’ or ‘‘abstract’’ nature of smell, but only that smell is not directed to
particular things. According to the view defended in this paper, odors are properties
of stuffs. This view, motivated by several arguments grounded in the phenome-
nology of olfactory experience, explains in particular why odors appear to be
located both in the air around our nose and in the objects from which they emanate.
It also explains the power of smell in the task of discriminating chemical
compounds.
Keywords Perception  Perceptual experience  Odors  Smell  Olfactory
experience
1 Introduction
Following Brentano, most philosophers agree that our perceptions are intentional in
the sense that they are directed toward things different from themselves. Thus, when
I see a table, my perception of the table has at least two components: the act of
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seeing and its intentional object, the table. Although most philosophical theories of
perception agree about the intentionality of perception, there are significant
divergences regarding the ontological nature of its intentional object. It has been
argued, for example, that a scrupulous analysis of perception shows that ordinary
objects, like tables, are only indirectly perceived. According to indirect theories of
perception, when looking at a table it is not the table that we directly see, but some
perceptual intermediary. Depending on the particular version of indirect realism
defended, perceptual intermediaries have been identified with various entities: ideas,
sense data, contents, appearances, etc. This paper does not address the general
question of the ontological status of the objects of perception, but deliberately and
dogmatically considers the objects of perception to be public extramental entities.
This investigation regarding odors starts therefore from a direct or ‘‘naı¨ve’’
approach to perception, which holds that perceptual experiences are not mediated by
internal or mind-dependent entities.
I will use the term ‘‘odor’’ to refer to the intentional object of olfaction
independently of any metaphysical theory.1 ‘‘Smell’’ is a synonym of ‘‘odor’’ in
most occurrences. But I will try to minimize its use, since ‘‘smell,’’ also used as a
verb, can express the perceptive act through which odors are perceived.
One of the main virtues of direct realism is to validate the trust we generally have
in our senses. Although not infallible, our perceptual experiences are at the root of
our empirical knowledge. And it seems that the assumption of unmediated access to
the external world advocated by the direct realist does justice to the common or
‘‘naı¨ve’’ belief that, most of the time, things are as they appear in perception.
The direct realist assumption that we are directly aware of the world around us is
often combined with the view that perception involves being acquainted with
medium-sized three-dimensional material objects, like tables, apples, or birds. It is
therefore often assumed that a direct account of perception has to be given in terms
of material objects.2
If visual experience involves some form of acquaintance with material objects, what
about the other sense modalities? Do audition, touch, taste, and smell also imply an
immediate or direct awareness of material objects? Recent philosophical approaches to
nonvisual modalities have considerably enriched our understanding of perception by
investigating modalities and topics rarely studied from philosophical perspectives. And
many recent works have suggested that a careful scrutiny of nonvisual modalities
provides compelling reasons to open the realm of perceptual objects to a large spectrum
of ontological categories in addition to those of material objects and their properties.
Audition in particular has been the target of numerous papers discussing the nature of
1 Unfortunately, the term ‘‘odor’’ has been used to refer to a particular theory that identifies the object of
olfaction as gaseous emanations, clouds of molecules, or vaporous entities. As the rest of the paper should
make clear, the use of ‘‘odor’’ here does not represent an endorsement of this particular theory.
2 The idea that visual perception involves a direct acquaintance with material objects doesn’t exclude the
seeing of other kinds of entities. As stressed by O’Callaghan: ‘‘This doesn’t rule out that you’re ever
visually aware of other material things, such as parts of material objects, or events in which material
objects participate, or that you’re ever visually aware of qualities or properties of material objects, or
relations among them. But being visually aware of each of those sorts of things standardly also involves
being visually aware of material objects’’ (O’Callaghan 2011, p. 145).
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sounds and proposing that the intentional objects of audition are events rather than
objects.3 The present paper pursues a similar goal by examining the nature of olfaction.
It holds that the intentional objects of olfactory perceptions, the odors, are best
conceived as properties of stuffs rather as properties of individual material objects. The
distinction between stuffs and things is complex and highly controversial, but it can be
roughly understood as the distinction prevailing between objects and their constituting
matter. Statues, tables, and trees are paradigmatic examples of objects, whereas copper,
water, and wood are paradigmatic examples of stuffs. Objects and stuffs differ in many
respects. For example, unlike individual things, stuffs persist despite division and
transformation. If a statue made of bronze is melted to obtain two bronze cups, the
statue disappears whereas the bronze persists.
I will argue that olfactory perception involves being acquainted with stuffs rather
than particular objects and that the notion of stuff is essential for understanding the
idiosyncratic characteristics of olfaction. The argument will proceed as follows. In
the first part, I will give a short inventory of olfactory experiences. In the second
part, I will show how most philosophical accounts fail to do justice to the
phenomenology of olfactory experiences. In the last part, I will argue that olfactory
experiences present compelling evidence that odors are properties of stuffs.
2 A world of odors
Unlike colors, and to a lesser extent sounds, odors and olfaction have received little
attention from philosophers. In philosophy, odors are sometimes mentioned to
illustrate the distinction between primary and secondary qualities (Locke 1690) or to
exemplify the category of ‘‘sense-data’’ (Russell 1912) or ‘‘qualia’’ (Campbell 2004;
Jackson 1982), but they are rarely considered for their own interest. Thomas Reid’s
work is a notable exception; an entire chapter of his Inquiry into the Human Mind
on the Principles of Common Sense ([1764] 2000) is dedicated to smell. It is
remarkable that Reid’s discussion of the external senses starts with a long chapter
devoted to olfaction. Reid’s justification for this choice is that an inquiry into human
understanding must proceed from the simplest to the more complex and that the
same principle should be applied to the philosophical examination of the senses.
Therefore, Reid starts his discussion of the senses with olfaction not because it is
‘‘the noblest, or the most useful’’4 sense, but because it is, according to him, the
simplest. Reid’s view regarding the simplicity of smell appears to have roots in
antiquity. Aristotle, for example, considers smell to be both poor and inaccurate:
Smell and its object are much less easy to determine than what we have
hitherto discussed; the distinguishing characteristic of the object of smell is
less obvious than those of sound or colour. The ground of this is that our
power of smell is less discriminating and in general inferior to that of many
species of animals; men have a poor sense of smell and our apprehension of its
3 See Casati and Dokic (2005).
4 chap. II, section II.
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proper objects is inseparably bound up with and so confused by pleasure and
pain, which shows that in us the organ is inaccurate.5
The goal of this section is to rehabilitate the sense of olfaction in view of such allegations
by showing with a few examples and facts that our sense of olfaction is both extremely
discriminating and highly sensitive. The first step will be to clarify the function of
olfactory perception and to get a better appreciation of what our nose tells us about our
environment. What better way to demonstrate the importance and impact of olfaction in
our daily lives than envisaging what it would be like to be deprived of it? Consider the
testimony of Anita Chang, who lost her sense of smell after an car accident:
I spent a good part of Saturday morning over my bathroom sink, hand-washing
clothes—scrubbing my cheery red sweaters and wringing out my Victoria’s
Secret bras. The clothes may or may not have been dirty. They might well
have still smelled sunshine fresh. I wouldn’t know. […]
It’s like living behind a film of Saran Wrap. I’m in a world where, if my eyes
were closed, I wouldn’t know the difference between walking into a bakery
and stepping into a gas-station bathroom.
After the accident, my parents immediately installed a natural-gas detector in
my apartment. I have a gas stove; if it leaked, I would have no idea. I have to
make sure my smoke alarm works, because I would sleep right through a fire.
That’s the obvious stuff. Other things I’ve had to figure out day by day.
Milk is tricky. How do you tell if it’s spoiled if you can’t smell it? Out of
habit, I still stick my nose into the crusty top of the bottle, trying to sniff out
sourness. I hold it to the light. I shake the bottle, watching the milk slosh
against the sides while I look for chunkiness. Usually, I end up pouring out the
milk, just to be safe. Same with leftovers. […]
Imagine the holidays without your sense of smell. On Thanksgiving, my
brother cooked a huge spread and I missed out on the smells. Turkey skin
sizzling to a perfect crispiness? Nothing. Jalapeno cornbread browning in the
oven? Nothing. The savory yumminess of stuffing on the stove? Nope. […]
I’ll tell you a secret. Not having my sense of smell has made kissing quite dull.
What’s the point when you can’t smell aftershave/sweat/beer on a hunky boy?
The excitement, the intimacy of knowing a person’s smell is gone. (Chang 2005)
As Chang points out, smell pervades all aspects and all stages of our lives. It helps
us to fulfill our biological needs by locating and selecting food. It protects us from
harmful substances like decayed meats or burning materials. It shapes our social
interactions by helping us recognize our kin6 and select a potential mate.7 But smell
5 Aristotle, On the Soul, translated by J.A. Smith, II.9.
6 Porter (1999).
7 Several studies show that humans and mice can smell genetic variations in a potential mate, suggesting
that olfactory detection of body odor operates as a mechanism of avoiding inbreeding.
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is not just a matter of survival; it is also a matter of aesthetics. Like painting for
sight or music for hearing, perfume incarnates the art of smell. You can certainly
find pleasant odors around you, but perfumes cannot be reduced to pleasurable
encounters. Perfumes are complex creations that involve grace, balance, proportion,
and inventiveness. They are evanescent and unique constructions that can be
explored and compared in an infinite number of ways. Consider for example Tania
Sanchez’s review of ‘‘Lolita Lempicka’’:
With most of the many fragrances based on Thierry Mugler’s Angel, the first
thing you think on smelling them is ‘‘Hello, Angel.’’ Not this time. Perfumer
Annick Me´nardo found the sole variation that stands on its own. In Angel, a
loud fruity-floral accord of jasmine, mango, and black currant, like cleavage
set to trumpets, is backed up by a somewhat louche and curiously masculine
sweet woody section centered on patchouli. Together they sing a husky-voiced
come-on. Lolita Lempicka, the first and best of the post-Angel crowd, keeps
the sweet woody stuff but skips the pushup bra; instead, it plays out a fresh
anisic melody that begins in salty licorice and modulates through several leafy
changes as refreshing as lime soda pop, playing Doris Day to Angel’s Peggy
Lee. The fragrance is snappy and smart, an ideal accompaniment for flirtatious
banter delivered by prim girls in glasses.8
Despite the lack of serious estimates of how many odors the human nose can
detect,9 the capacity of the human olfactory system to detect and discriminate
among odorant molecules in infinitesimal quantities is inarguably excellent. And
even if human beings have great difficulty verbalizing their olfactory experiences or
identifying specific odors, there seems to be little reason to conclude that human
olfaction is poor or confused.
The aim of this paper is not to describe the richly populated world of odors or to
discuss possible odor categories or dimensions. It will therefore not try to explain
why roses smell the way they do or answer questions about presumable differences
or similarities between odors. The goal of this paper is rather to show that a
philosophical approach to olfaction that identifies odors with properties of stuffs
captures the general features of olfactory experiences and explains what
distinguishes olfaction from the other sense modalities.
Rather than exploring the intrinsic characteristics of olfactory experiences,
philosophers tend to compare them to the other sense modalities, generally vision.
The result is that olfaction and odors are often negatively described:
(1) Smell is informationnally very poor (Lycan 2000, p. 277; Batty 2010b, p. 103).
(2) Smell lacks intramodal robustness; i.e., there is no olfactory perspective
(Lycan 2000, p. 277).
(3) Smell is aspatial (Lycan 2000, p. 278) or spatially undifferentiated (Batty
2010a, p. 524, 2010b, p. 111).
8 Turin and Sanchez (2008, p. 228).
9 Gilbert (2008, p. 4).
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(4) Olfactory experience presents an undifferentiated smudge of properties. It
seems disengaged from any particular object (Batty 2010a, pp. 518, 527,
2010b, pp. 111, 112).
(5) Olfactory experiences are nonrepresentational (Reid 1764, chap. II, section II;
Peacocke 1983, p. 5)
I will argue that most characterizations of olfaction like (1)–(5) rest on the assumption
that the intentional objects of olfaction are individual things. I will show that, once
odors are described in terms of stuffs, (1)–(5) can be reinterpreted as follows:
(1) Smell is informationnally poor with respect to individual things, but
informationnally rich with respect to stuffs.
(2) There are no olfactory perspectives, because stuffs (the objects of smell) are
not, like individual things, spatially oriented.
(3) Odors lack the spatial contours usually attributed to visual qualities, because
odors are not restricted to an object’s spatial boundaries.
(4) Stuffs are directly perceived by smell, whereas particular objects are only
indirectly perceived by smell.
(5) Olfactory experiences are representational, but they do not represent individual
objects.
3 Current views on odors and smell
As noted by many philosophers, smell seems to differ in many respects from the
other sense modalities. First of all, smell seems very poor in relation to spatial
information. Olfactory experiences seem to lack all the spatial organization we gain
through other sense modalities. Compare for example the richness of my visual
experience of a piece of cheese on my kitchen table with the olfactory experience I
have when I enter the kitchen. When I look at a piece of cheese, I am able to perceive
its location in the room and its relative position to my body and to the other objects
in the room. My visual experience also contains information about the object’s size,
shape, orientation, etc. Olfactory experiences, on the other hand, appear to be rather
poor with respect to their spatial content. As stressed by Matthen,10 odors are
diffused and vaguely located around the perceiver. Olfactory perceptions neither
represent the relative position of objects as do vision or touch, nor their direction as
does audition.
The apparent informational poverty and spatial indeterminateness of odor
experiences have led many philosophers to conclude that olfactory experiences are
purely sensational rather than world-directed as are vision or touch. Consider
Lycan’s comparison between smell and audition:
Hearing, too, comes to us spatially organized, even phenomenally speaking
[…]. By contrast, smell is aspatial. Phenomenologically, an odor is just with
us, happening right in the center of our minds. (Lycan 2000, p. 278)
10 Matthen (2005, p. 284).
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Lycan denies that olfactory experiences are spatial and maintains therefore that
‘‘phenomenally speaking, a smell is just a modification of our consciousness, a
qualitative condition or event in us.’’11 According to this view, the absence of
spatial features in olfactory experiences renders them purely sensational, and they
therefore lack the world-directed properties exhibited by vision and audition.12
The paucity of spatial information involved in olfactory experiences also
constitutes a major objection to the claim that smell is directed to particular objects.
Unlike vision, for example, smell alone has no way of telling us how many pizzas
there are in the oven or the number of roses there are in a bouquet standing right
under our noses. In effect, spatial experience appears to be crucial for perceiving
objects. In order to perceive something as an individual object, one must be able to
distinguish it from its surroundings and from other objects. Individuating objects in
this way depends therefore on experiencing them as spatially extended and bounded
entities. The fact that olfactory experiences do not present odors at distinct locations
makes the view that smell is directed to objects rather questionable.
Recent papers on olfaction have contested the view that the apparent spatial
indeterminateness of olfactory experiences should lead to the conclusion that smell
is not world-directed. According to Batty (2011), for example, the world-
directedness of olfactory experiences is remarkably different from that of visual
experiences. Unlike visual experiences, which present particular objects as being
located at particular places, olfactory experiences do not present olfactory properties
at determinate locations. They just appear to be located in the subject’s olfactory
field. Although there seem to be few phenomenological reasons to ascribe olfactory
properties to particular objects, Batty suggests that we should not conclude that
olfactory experiences fail to attribute properties to objects. In fact, she argues that
olfactory experiences are essentially abstract in the sense that they don’t aim at a
particular object, but rather represent ‘‘that there is something or other here with
certain properties.’’13 To illustrate her abstract account of olfactory experiences,
Batty considers Drestke’s limiting cases,14 such as visual experiences of staring at a
white ceiling while lying in bed or of looking up at a cloudless blue sky. In these
cases, we cannot differentiate one particular object as white or blue, even though we
clearly see something white or blue. In the same way, Batty suggests, when we
smell citrus in the garden, we don’t experience one particular object as lemony, we
just experience something as lemony.
11 Lycan (2000, p. 281).
12 To be more accurate, I should stress that Lycan (1996, chap. 7) argues that smells represent ‘‘clouds of
molecules diffusing in the air’’ and also ordinary objects in an indirect level of representation. But his
approach differs from the one advocated here in the sense that Lycan’s notion of content is teleological.
However, he insists that at the phenomenological level smell is just a quale which does not itself present
anything else than ‘‘a modification of consciousness, a qualitative condition or event in us’’ (Lycan 2000,
p. 281).
13 Batty (2011, p. 172).
14 Dretske holds that a subject S sees an object D if and only if D is ‘‘visually differentiated from its
immediate environment by S’’ (1969, p. 20), except for the ‘‘limiting cases’’ in which the object seen ‘‘has
no environment’’ (1969, p. 26). In those cases, the differentiation clause ‘‘becomes inoperative when
nothing appears to S that is not part of D’’ (1969, p. 27).
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Another strategy for resisting the conclusion that olfactory experiences are purely
sensational is given by Richardson (2013). According to her view, the visuocentric
model of perception has wrongly assumed that an exteroceptive experience15 should
involve distance and direction. In fact, what olfactory experiences show is that
neither distance nor direction are necessary for something to be perceived as
external and spatially distinct from the perceiver. According to Richardson, the
exteroceptivity of smell is assured by the act of sniffing. When a smelling
experience occurs, odors are brought into the nose by sniffing. The fact that odors
are revealed in experience by ‘‘being brought in from without’’ explains why odors
are perceived as being external to the perceiver’s body and why they seem to be in
the vicinity of the perceiver’s nose. Richardson is certainly correct in stressing that
olfactory experience involves bringing something into the nose from outside by
sniffing, but it is far from clear how something brought into the nose from outside
ends up being represented as being outside the nose. Suppose for example that you
inadvertently inhale a mosquito. It is likely that the feeling you have when this
happens is not of something located around you, but rather of something being stuck
in your nose. Because sniffing involves bringing in something from outside, it can
explain why smell is not interoceptive like bodily sensations such as pains or itches,
but it does not really help us understand why odors are perceived as being in the
subject’s vicinity and not in the subject’s nose.
Although I do believe, like Batty and Richardson, that olfaction is neither
subjective nor interoceptive, I hold the belief for different reasons. I agree with
Batty that olfactory experiences do not seem to present ordinary objects. When we
enter a room, we cannot tell by smell only how many apples there are or if a vanilla
odor corresponds to a scented candle or a homemade cake. So if ordinary things are
not presented in olfactory experiences, what kind of information about reality does
smell convey? According to Batty, smell represents olfactory properties without
representing something having these properties. She explains that
smells are attributed to objects but in no way that allows us to pick out the
individual objects that instantiate them. According to what I call the abstract
view of olfactory content, although potentially rich in terms of the properties it
represents as present in your environment (as rich as the situation we are in
and our discriminatory abilities allow), olfactory experience only ever
predicates properties to just one object—and not in any way that enables us
to pick that object out. That is to say, olfactory experience predicates
properties to ‘‘something we know not what’’ at the undifferentiated location
of ‘‘here’’. On the abstract view, then, olfactory experience represents that
there is something or other here with certain properties. (Batty 2011, p. 170)
Although she advocates for a representational approach to olfaction, Batty seems to
embrace the traditional view that considers smell to be deprived of the richness
found in vision. According to her abstract view, smell is like vision minus its rich
15 As Richardson rightly points out, in resisting the idea that odors are external to the body, philosophers
have often supposed that smell is nonexteroceptive.
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spatial content. This is shown by the fact that she equates olfactory experiences with
the extremely poor visual experience of looking statically at a white ceiling or a blue
sky. But those cases, as she rightly stresses, are limiting visual cases. Dretske’s
limiting visual experiences result from the subject being placed in an environment
deprived of almost all visual data. Rather than showing that visual experiences can
have abstract content, as suggested by Batty, Dretske’s limiting visual experiences
really show that in some extreme situations visual experiences can be highly
underdeterminate. My experience of looking statically at a white ceiling, for
example, fails to provide the spatial features necessary to localize and identify the
white expanse in front of me. But unless olfactory experiences are reduced or
indeterminate in this way, the analogy with Dretske’s limiting experiences fails to
illuminate the nature of olfactory perception.
I agree with Batty that smells, unlike visual properties, don’t appear at particular
locations. Unlike colors or shapes, smells seem to be vaguely located around the
perceiver. But, at the same time, as she rightly points out, the olfactory system
constitutes an informational system that guides our behavior effectively. For
example, when it comes to choosing the right food, olfaction is vital. It seems,
therefore, that the problem with olfaction is not that odors don’t have definite
locations like the colored expanses in Dretske’s limiting experiences, but that they
are at the same time attributed to particular objects like hot apple pies or rotten eggs.
Smelling does not appear to be confined to indistinct locations after all. And as is
stressed by ordinary talk, odors can also be attributed to things: flowers have a
delicate scent and skunks stink. It seems therefore that the intentional object of
olfaction can be referred to in two different ways. We can say, for example, that
either
(i) I smell the cheese in the kitchen, or
(ii) I smell the odor of cheese filling the kitchen or I smell a cheesy odor around
me.
Although (i) and (ii) are not strictly incompatible, they have very different
implications regarding the localization of odors provided by olfaction. In (i), the
odor appears to be located where the piece of cheese is to be found, whereas in (ii)
the odor appears in the air surrounding the perceiver. How should this ambivalence
be interpreted? Should we favor (i) at the expense of (ii), the converse, or accept
both (i) and (ii)?
Because Batty is interested primarily in showing that olfaction is representational
even when olfactory experiences do not present smells at distinct locations, she
doesn’t give full consideration situations in which odors are attributed to particular
objects, as in (i).
As for Richardson, she clearly denies the truth of (i) by asserting that our relation
with odor sources is cognitive rather than perceptual. She explains that, in contrast
to our relation to visual objects, we are almost insensitive to the comings and goings
of odor sources in our environment. We can, for example, still smell the cheese in
the kitchen long after it has been eaten. She also observes that locating odor sources
depends on other sense modalities as well as on other cognitive resources. She gives
the following example:
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[…] had I not the ability to recognise this odour as that characteristically
produced by roses, and were I not also able to see the roses in the room, my
olfactory experience would be no guide at all to the presence of roses in my
vicinity. I could just as easily conclude that there was something else rose-
scented about, such as air-freshener or a perfume-wearing friend. (Batty 2011,
p. 404)
Therefore, according to Richardson, I cannot smell the piece of cheese on the table,
but only identify it as being the source of the odor I can smell in the kitchen. But if
Richardson is right, the consequences are far from trivial. As just stressed, it would
be literally wrong to say that we can smell the subtle bouquet of a wine or the
refreshing smell of eucalyptus, because we literally can smell only the odor those
objects emit, not the objects themselves. However, this view seems to conflict with
the phenomenology of certain ordinary situations. If you wonder whether the milk
in your fridge is spoiled, you will most likely place the bottle of milk under your
nose and sniff it. And if you cannot identify by sight alone which spice is in a jar,
sniffing it will probably help you to find out. Contrary to Richardson’s view, it
seems that odor sources are not necessarily identified through other sense modalities
or cognitive resources, but that in many cases smell alone has the last word about
their real nature and identity.
Like Batty and Richardson, I will defend the view that smell is exteroceptive and
world-directed. But I will argue that only an account of the nature of odor in terms
of stuffs can capture the characteristics of olfactory experiences. I will maintain that
if odors are only vaguely located around the observer, it’s not because olfactory
experiences are abstract or indeterminate in any particular way, but because odors
are not properties of particular and discrete objects, but properties of stuffs. But
what are stuffs? And how does the notion of ‘‘stuff’’ capture the specificity of
olfaction and odors? The following sections address these questions.
4 The notion of stuff
The category of stuff has occasioned many interesting and controversial questions.
One way to understand this notion is to contrast it with the category of individual
objects. Stuffs are typically referred to by ‘‘mass nouns’’ like ‘‘water,’’ ‘‘wood,’’ and
‘‘oatmeal,’’ whereas individual objects are referred to by ‘‘count nouns’’ like
‘‘chair,’’ ‘‘molecule,’’ or ‘‘lake.’’ Individual objects can be counted; stuff can’t. The
relation between objects and stuffs can be understood as one of constitution. This
kind of relation obtains when an object is made of a certain portion of stuff. A chair
can be made of wood and a fork can be made of iron, for example.
Objects have characteristic shapes and sizes, but stuffs don’t.16 A lake and a glass
of water have distinct sizes and shapes. Water, on the contrary, can be found in both
lakes and glasses, as well as in rivers and tears. Stuffs are independent from their
16 Because stuffs have neither shape nor size, the chemist can store stuffs by keeping samples and
pulverize stuffs before conducting experiments.
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shape, but their structure, on the other hand, is crucial. As noticed by Soentgen,
‘‘every portion of a stuff displays, or at least can display, structures that are typical
for the stuff. Every portion of stuff has, at least potentially, a structured inner
organization.’’17 The inner structure of a stuff is revealed, for example, by its
disposition to drip, bend, or to be torn or smashed to pieces.
Unlike individual objects, a stuff can be divided without losing its essential
properties. By cutting a cake in several slices, I destroy the cake, but ‘‘create’’ cake
slices instead. Unlike the cake, the identity of the yummy stuff from which the cake
is made does not change when it is cut. Fortunately, the stuff of the original cake
and the stuff of the slices obtained after cutting it is the same. The homeomerosity18
of stuff is also the reason the chemist can study stuffs by doing experiments on tiny
samples only. If any portion of a stuff has the same properties as any other portion,
what we know about one portion can be generalized to all the other portions of the
same stuff.
Chemistry is the science of matter, or ‘‘stuff.’’ Whereas physics focuses on the
behavior of discrete objects or things, chemistry explores their inner nature. As
clearly expressed by Lewowicz and Lombardi (2013) in a recent paper: ‘‘the
ontological category that underlies the discourse and the practice of macro-
chemistry is the category of stuff. Our effort has been directed to stress the deep
breakdown between the ontology of macro-chemistry, inhabited by stuffs, and the
ontology that prevailed in Western philosophy and physics, populated by
individuals and properties.’’ However, our knowledge of stuff doesn’t start with
chemistry. We deal with stuffs every day and have no trouble distinguishing among
them. Take a bowl of sugar and a bowl of salt in a kitchen. They look perfectly
alike, but most people know that tasting them is a very direct way to tell them apart.
If chemistry is the science of stuff, it is not surprising that smell and taste are
referred to as the chemical senses. But our everyday knowledge of stuffs doesn’t rest
on their gustative or olfactory properties only. By touching, for example, we know
which stuff is hard, soft, sticky, moist, liquid, granular, etc., and most sounds we
hear reveal the inner structure of a resonating object.
Unlike portions of stuff that exist in space and time, stuffs are not spatiotem-
porally located. We can point to a portion of water in a glass, for example, but water
as a stuff cannot be identified in spatiotemporal terms. We can distinguish a
particular stuff from another through certain characteristics like solubility, hardness,
rigidity, viscosity, thermodynamic properties, taste, or smell, but stuffs are not
individuated by their spatiotemporal properties. The conclusion argued for here—
that olfaction targets stuffs rather than objects—should therefore be distinguished
from alternative theories that identify odors with individual objects or aggregates
like molecules or clouds of molecules.
17 Soentgen (2008, p. 80).
18 Something is said to be homeomerous if it remains invariant across any arbitrary partition. If X is iron,
a portion of X is iron. However, most stuffs are only ‘‘relatively homeomerous’’ because there is for most
stuffs a limitation to their homeomerosity.
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5 Odors as stuff properties
I have argued so far that olfaction is not informationnally poor even though it fails
to identify individual objects in our environment. The next step is to show that only
a characterization of odors as stuff properties adequately captures the phenome-
nology of olfaction. To reach this goal, I will consider in turn the following
characteristics of olfactory experiences:
(1) Pervasiveness: the same odor is experienced as being in many places at the
same time.
(2) Object recognition: although smell does not track particular objects, odors can
single out particular objects.
(3) Chemical identification: By keeping track of stuffs, smell can identify
chemical transformations.
(4) Mereological simplicity: odors do not appear to have either spatial or temporal
parts.
5.1 Pervasiveness
Philosophical views regarding the spatial content of olfactory experiences are quite
diverse. Lycan suggests that smell is aspatial (2000, p. 278), Smith holds that we
experience smells in our nose (2002, p. 139), Richardson maintains that odors are in
the vicinity of the nose (2013, p. 417), and Matthen (2005, p. 284) and Batty (2010b,
p. 112) claim that odors are indeterminately located around the perceiver. I suggest
that this variety of opinions about the spatiality of smell originates from the fact that
the objects of smell are pervasive and unlocalized, unlike the objects of most other
sense modalities. Consider vision. Our visual field is populated with three-
dimensional objects with determinate shapes, sizes, and locations. When sitting at
my desk, I can see my two hands on a black keyboard, a white mug on my right, and
a flat monitor screen facing me. The keyboard, the mug, and the monitor have clear
spatial boundaries that define their spatial location and the spatial relations they bear
to me and to each other. Except in limiting cases, like watching a uniform expanse
filling the visual field,19 visual experience presents us with discrete objects at
different locations. The objects of smell, by contrast, have no clear boundaries and
their locations are indeterminate. When I enter a kitchen filled with an odor of
roasted chicken, I notice the presence of the odor but don’t perceive immediately
where this odor is located or where it comes from. As I walk through the kitchen, I
may continue to notice its presence and its variations of intensity. The odor can fade
away while I’m leaving the kitchen, but the point in space where I can no longer
smell the odor is generally hard to locate.
The evanescent and formless aspects of odor seem to indicate that odors are
properties of the ambient air. But restricting odors to the air, or to the molecules that
fill it, seems to disregard the role we usually ascribe to smell. Odors can catch our
attention and make us act in various ways. An odor of smoke prompts the cook to
19 See above, p. 2.
244 V. Mizrahi
123
check the stove for burning food, a delicate perfume encourages the gardener to
sniff the flowers around her, and a corky smell in a glass of wine persuades the
sommelier to open a new bottle. If smell were directed only toward the air
surrounding us, our actions based on olfactory experiences and directed to objects
would be quite mysterious. Why would our appreciation of wines rely on their
odors? Why would flowers invite us to put our nose in their petals? And why would
the odor of smoke trigger an immediate response in our internal warning system?
These example show that odor sources are genuine objects of olfactory experiences
and that there seems to be no evidence that acquaintance with odor sources is only
mediated by cognition. Moreover, it seems quite plausible to suppose that the
human olfactory system has evolved to recover information about odor sources, like
food or potential dangers, rather than atmospheric properties. But if odors are found
in objects, how should we explain the detection of odors in the absence of their
sources, and how should we respond to Richardson’s remark that ‘‘olfactory
experience is too insensitive to their [odor sources] comings and goings to count as
perceiving them’’20? My proposal is to acknowledge that odors are located both in
the air and in their sources.21 This apparently ad hoc solution to the pervasiveness of
odors becomes more plausible once it has been acknowledged that odors are not
properties of objects but properties of stuffs. As stressed earlier, a main
characteristic of stuff is its homeomerosity. When a stuff is divided into several
portions, the stuff of all the portions is the same. So the apparent sensitivity of smell
to the air around the perceiver’s nose rather as to the comings and goings of odor
sources can be explained in terms of the olfactory system’s sensitivity to the tiny
fractions of the stuff of odor sources disseminated in the air around its source.22 To
be detected by the olfactory system, volatile odorant molecules must detach from
the source and reach the inside of the nose. From an object perspective, it is dubious
to consider those volatile molecules to be part of the odor source. But from a stuff
perspective, the link between the volatile molecules and the source is obvious: both
are made of the same stuff. If smell seems to be insensitive to the comings and
goings of the odor sources, it’s because smell tracks odor sources by detecting the
traces of stuff dispersed in the air.23
20 Richardson (2013, pp. 403–404).
21 See n. 15.
22 The fact that olfactory experiences are caused by portions of stuffs doesn’t mean that olfactory
experiences represent portions of stuffs rather than stuffs. As stressed above, unlike stuffs, portions of
stuff are localized in regions of space. You can for instance move the portion of water filling your glass by
moving the glass, but water per se cannot be moved. The fact that portions of stuffs are causally
responsible for our perceptions of stuffs raises many interesting questions, but it should not force us to
conclude that we don’t perceive stuffs directly. In fact, I think that a closer look at olfaction shows exactly
the opposite. Portions of stuffs, like clouds of odoriferous molecules, are only indirectly perceived in
olfaction. What is directly perceived are the olfactory properties of their stuff discriminated by our sense
of smell.
23 Odors can be considered as a particular case of traces. Like odors, traces are often small quantities of
stuff detached from their original location. At a crime scene, for example, all kinds of stuff residues can
be used as trace evidence: soil, sand, paint, fibers, hairs, blood, saliva, etc. The fact that odors are traces is
also manifested in the way olfactory exploration is performed. Smelling relies on repetitive sniffs that
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5.2 Object recognition
As revealed by the investigation above, smell is not directed to individual objects,
but to stuffs. However, the capacity to identify and recognize stuffs through smell
can be exploited to identify individual objects provided these objects are constituted
by a characteristic stuff.
For an olfactory experience to take place, volatile molecules must detach from a
source and reach the inside of our nose by inhalation. We know that a typical odor
source, such as an apple, emits hundreds of different odorants. The correlation of
odors to complex mixtures of molecules explains the apparently colossal number of
odors we can smell.24 To capture the virtually inexhaustible variety of smell
experiences, it’s enough to remember that the modern era in perfumery began with
the invention of synthetic odorants in the late 19th century25 and that new odorant
molecules are still created by chemists every day. This seemingly infinite richness
accessible by the sense of smell explains how objects can be identified and
recognized by their odor.
Biological objects, like plants and animals for example, release quantities of
odorant molecules that are the products of the ongoing chemical reactions occurring
in living organisms. Biological bodies can therefore be regarded as chemical
factories that emit different volatile molecules. The number, identity, and relative
amounts of these molecules differ for each individual organism, giving them a
distinctive odor.
Despite the large number of basic and challenging questions remaining open
about the way the olfactory system responds to the volatile compounds, it is largely
agreed that a combinatorial activation of neurons is involved in olfactory
perception and that the human olfactory system can detect and discriminate
between thousands of chemical compounds. Several studies also show that animals
and humans are able to distinguish one individual from another member of the
species by their odor.26
Although odors are, as I have claimed, properties of stuffs, each individual
organism is constituted by a distinctive stuff that is the product of the complex
physical and chemical processes occurring in the organism. In the same way that
biometric characteristics, like fingerprints, are used to identify individuals, chemical
markers, like odors, can therefore be used to identify and trace the objects that
propagate them.
Footnote 23 continued
deliver odor molecules from the environment to olfactory receptors. Tracking an odor therefore pre-
supposes sampling of the environment in order to find chemical traces left by odor sources.
24 According to Gilbert (2008), and contrarily to what is often claimed, there is no serious scientific
estimation of the number of odors.
25 For a short history of the chemical discoveries that made modern perfumery possible, see Turin and
Sanchez (2008, pp. 33–40).
26 Cf. Porter (2000).
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5.3 Chemical transformations
Considering odors as properties of stuffs rather than of objects sheds some new light
on the phenomenology of smell. Unlike particular objects, stuffs don’t have built-in
boundaries that determine their identity through time. Unlike trees, cars, or
buildings, stuffs can be scattered and dispersed without losing their identity. Water
that starts its journey at the top of a mountain and travels as rivers into the valley
and to the ocean remains water regardless of its dispersion or streaming. Even
though stuffs may be crushed, pulverized, scattered, spilled, or dispersed and yet
remain the same, stuffs can also undergo substantial changes and cease to exist.
When ice melts into water or when wine turns to vinegar, there is a gradual
transformation from one kind of stuff into another. Systematic transformations of
stuffs are studied by chemistry labs, but transformations of stuffs happen also in
everyday life. We create foam by using soap or end up with ashes after lighting a
fire, for example. But the place in our homes where most of these transformations
take place is the kitchen. Every time you fry eggs, bake a cake, or boil vegetables,
numerous chemical reactions take place and stuffs undergo radical changes. We can
of course witness some of those transformations through sight, but taste and smell
are far superior when it comes to noticing them. For example, odors of cheese,
freshly baked cake, and hot bacon correspond to particular stuff transformations:
fermentation, caramelization, and Maillard reactions.
The idea that smelling involves being acquainted with stuffs instead of objects
explains the sensitivity of smell to chemical changes. Although it is not easy to give
identity criteria for stuffs, it is plausible to say that a chemical reaction is the
transformation of one stuff into another. If this analysis is correct, we can conclude
that smell gives access to stuffs and their transformations independently of the
objects they constitute. Whereas vision gives us access to the superficial properties
of objects, olfactory awareness aims directly at the inner nature of things.
5.4 Mereological simplicity
According to Lycan, odors are informationnally very poor, whereas ‘‘vision is
king.’’27 But this affirmation seems to be contestable if the apparent poverty of
olfaction is supposed to refer to its discriminatory power. As argued earlier, once it
is acknowledged that smell is directed to stuffs rather than objects, smell appears to
be highly sensitive and discriminative. However, Lycan’s remark can be interpreted
more productively if we understand the poverty of smell in terms of the organization
of olfactory experiences rather than in terms of its discriminatory power. It seems in
fact that the information furnished by vision about objects and their properties is
somewhat more structured than the way odors are represented in olfactory
experiences.
Visual objects are individuated by their colors, textures, shape, spatial properties,
and their cohesion through motion. They have a structural complexity exhibited by
27 Lycan (2000, p. 277).
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the way perceptible parts are integrated in a unified perceptible object. Consider the
fact that the content of our visual experiences changes as we move or as the object’s
location varies. As we move around a house, our perspectival relation to it changes,
and as a result we see different sides and different parts of the house. Moving closer
foregrounds the surfaces’ textural features, whereas changing our viewing angle
might disclose previously hidden sides. Visual experiences are therefore mereolog-
ically complex in the sense that different visible features are seen as different parts
of the same object.
Olfactory experiences, on the other hand, seem to lack such complexity. Odors
can vary in intensity, but they do not seem to have any kind of spatial complexity.28
Unlike visual objects, odors never appear to be partly occluded. They don’t have
profiles or hidden aspects. They don’t appear to be oriented—to have a top, a
bottom, and a left and right side. It seems therefore that odors are simple and that
they can be grasped in one sniff.
The mereological simplicity of odors can be linked to the distinctive uniformity
of stuffs. Unlike material objects, stuffs don’t have bona fide parts (i.e., parts that
exist independently of human partitioning). Division of stuffs is necessarily
arbitrary in the sense that stuffs don’t exhibit any qualitative, material, or spatial
discontinuity that could ground any demarcation between bona fide parts.
Odors are said to differ in longevity, but I think it would be misleading to say that
odors have temporal parts. Perfumers use the word ‘‘note’’ to describe the longevity
of the scents composing a fragrance. A perfume is divided into three sets of notes
that create an olfactory accord. The top notes are the scents immediately perceived
after a perfume has been applied. They are followed by middle notes, which produce
the bridge between the top and the base notes. The base notes provide the long-term
effect of a fragrance and convey its depth. Even though a perfume is said to evolve
according to the longevity of its olfactory components in the air, it is questionable
whether one should consider odors to be temporally extended and to have real
temporal parts. Unlike sounds, odors are not ‘‘creatures of time’’29 whose identities
rely on their temporal characteristics. Like our visual experiences, our olfactory
experiences have a certain duration, but neither visual30 nor olfactory objects are
experienced and conceived as temporal entities. The identity of a smell is not
anchored in its evolution in time. An odor can appear or disappear from our
olfactory field, but it is wholly present at each moment we smell it. Odors, according
to this analysis, are not intrinsically temporal entities.
28 As suggested to me by Kevin Mulligan, distinguishing between spatial location and spatial extension
could be useful for understanding the spatiality of smells. The fact that smells have no extension could
account for the fact that they are located in space but lack spatial parts.
29 O’Callaghan (2007, p. 14).
30 In addition to individual things, like trees or teapots, visual perception can also be directed to events or
processes, like car accidents or footraces. It seems that this diversity is also available in olfaction. As
emphasized above, we can smell some transformations from one stuff to another. The odor of smoke, for
example, corresponds to the perception of a process (combustion) rather than to the perception of a
persisting stuff.
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6 Conclusion
Philosophy of perception has traditionally focused on vision and visual experiences.
I have suggested that olfaction differs from vision in several fundamental respects
and that a new singularized approach to the philosophy of olfaction is needed. I have
argued in particular that, unlike vision, the objects of smell are stuffs and their
properties. This new approach to the nature of odors has several implications.
On this account, odors are not private entities like sensations. They are located in
space and are publicly accessible. But unlike visual objects, they don’t appear to
have clear spatial boundaries. According to this approach, odors characterize
individual things only because they are properties of the stuff that constitutes them.
Individual things can change or even disappear, but as long as the properties of the
stuff remain the same, odors survive those changes. Analyzing odors in terms of
properties of stuff captures the specificity of olfaction. It explains in particular why
odors appear to be both located in the air around our nose and in the objects from
which they emanate. It also explains the power of smell in the task of discriminating
chemical compounds.
In focusing on the phenomenological characteristics of olfactory experiences, I
have emphasized the notion of stuff and proposed to consider stuffs as the primary
objects of olfactory perception. Our world is filled with natural stuffs like wood,
mud, snow, sand, blood, and flesh, and artificial stuffs like glass, shampoo, soap,
fabrics, and yogurts. And most of our interactions within the world involve the
capacity to finely discriminate among stuffs. But stuffs are not only smelled; they
can be seen, touched, tasted, and probably heard. Despite their pervasive presence in
our lives, stuffs have largely been neglected by philosophical approaches to
perception.31 There are therefore good reasons to bet that by turning their attention
to stuffs, philosophers could discover exciting perspectives and challenges, not only
in the study of smell, but also in their accounts of all the other sense modalities.
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